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COMMENTARY ON TYPHUS CONTROL IN WORLD WAR II
STANHOPE BAYNE-JONES*
This article for the volume to be published on the occasion of the retire-
ment of Dr. Winternitz as Professor of Pathology is one of the final entries
of a journal that was opened under his instruction about thirty-five years
ago. Although the writer, as a medical student and resident, had received
unforgettably vivid teaching from Dr. Winternitz during the period from
1911 to 1915, the associations with which this article deals began formally
in 1916. In that year, after a few months of training under Dr. Hans Zinsser,
I was put in charge of the new Laboratory for Bacteriology on the Fifth
Floor which Dr. Winternitz had recently added to the old Pathology Build-
ing at the Johns Hopkins Medical School. In the original "protocol" of the
experimental program, and of the even more experimental appointment,
there was no mention of typhus fever and little, if anything, about medical
administration. There were, of course, no indications of the unforseen events
of the future. Nevertheless, the apparently accidental arrangements of those
days started the series of happenings that finally included the opportunity
to take part in the administration of typhus control in World War II. It is
now clear that throughout the haphazard occurrences of the years since 1916
a main element in the Fifth Floor protocol, although unwritten, was the
influence of Dr. Winternitz's philosophy and conceptions of relationships
among people, communities, and ideas. Typhus and typhus control involve
these relationships through the natural history of the disease and the social
and economic implications of its prevention. Hence, a pupil of Dr. Winter-
nitz working in that field would be especially aware of his influence, as well
as of his example and contributions. It is with recollections going back to
Baltimore before our country's entry into World War I, with thoughts of
unbroken association over the years, and with awareness of his influence
that these observations on typhus control in World War II are offered for
this volume dedicated to Dr. Winternitz.
The word "commentary" in the title of this paper is intended to mean an
attempt to generalize from specific instances and to venture a few opinions
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and speculative remarks relative to the control of louse-borne, exanthematic
typhus fever that was achieved during World War II. Details and docu-
mentation might well be demanded by the reader. Fortunately, the scientific
work, outlines of the administrative arrangements, and descriptions of the
main episodes have been published. The few selected references1'- at the
end of this article must serve as a guide to the larger literature. The whole
undertaking, however, was such a vast collaboration of individuals and
agencies in democratic nations engaged in a total war effort that neither
documentation nor adequate acknowledgement is possible in a paper of this
sort. An article published in 1948' contained names and mention of many
individuals and military and civilian agencies that were devoted to this
collaboration. It is admittedly incomplete. A full account is planned for
publication in a volume connected with the medical history of the war.
Meanwhile, the writer begs the informed reader to fill in the details and also
to understand that while his immediate opportunity to participate in this
work came from connection with the Army, he is fully aware of all associ-
ations with other Services and agencies.
Two main conclusions have been drawn from the results of the attack
against typhus during the war. One is that American troops were effectively
protected against typhus. The other is that epidemics of typhus fever among
civilian populations were brought under control and stopped. It is of some
interest to examine both claims.
During the war, from 1941 to 1945, there were only 64 cases of epidemic,
louse-borne typhus fever among American troops and no deaths. The chief
specific preventive measures employed among troops were those directed
against louse infestation and procedures for the establishment and main-
tenance of immunity by injections of typhus vaccine. Contributory general
preventive measures were those of personal hygiene, cleanliness, good nutri-
tion, proper housing when available, avoidance of contact with known
sources of infection, and education. The average age group of the troops
was a favorable element against fatality, but their previous lack of exposure
to typhus had given them no opportunity to acquire immunity naturally.
Where so many general factors are contributing to a final result it is difficult
to assess the value of specific measures. However, it appears possible to do
so with regard to anti-louse measures and vaccination against typhus.
With regard to the value of anti-louse measures in protection against
typhus no question of principle was raised or has been raised. Since 1909,
when Nicolle proved that the body louse transmitted epidemic typhus among
human beings, it has been obvious that prevention of infestation with lice
484COMMENTARY ON TYPHUS CONTROL IN WORLD WAR II
and delousing of the infested would prevent the spread of typhus. The rare
exceptions were infections acquired by inhalation of infected louse feces or
by the introduction of infected louse feces into the conjunctival sac. The
German and Austrian armies in Central Europe in 1915 demonstrated the
fact that by bathing and steam disinfestation of clothing the occurrence of
typhus among troops could be held to a low level in the midst of even so
large a civilian outbreak of the disease as the Serbian epidemic. However,
later, during World War I, troops on the Western Front with a high rate
of louse infestation and suffering from outbreaks of the louse-borne rickett-
sial disease, trench fever, were free from typhus. No doubt this apparent
mystery is to be explained by low incidence of exposure to typhus.
Although there was no question of principle involved, there was a crucial
decision to be made relative to delousing methods and materials about 1943
when evidence of the effectiveness of new insecticide powders was coming
in from reports of extensive investigations of the Department of Agricul-
ture, and the International Health Division of the Rockefeller Foundation
and the Army. The first of these preparations was the pyrethrin containing
MYL, and this was soon followed by DDT (used as a powder of 10 per
cent dichlorodiphenyltrichlorethane in pyrophylite). Both were effective;
DDT superior. Contradictory reports of field tests made by the U.S.A.
Typhus Commission at Cairo were corrected by further trials. Largely
through the clear sight of Colonel William S. Stone a correct evaluation of
the evidence was reached and the decision was made to rely on anti-louse
powders, with persistent action, in place of cumbersome steam disinfestors.
Later in 1943 the demonstrations of mass delousing by dusting civilians
with DDT powder, carried out by Dr. Fred L. Soper and the Rockefeller
Foundation Team in North Africa, placed this method on a firm basis.
Thus the prevention of louse-infestation by the use of insecticidal powder
became not only a safeguard of troops against typhus but also a revolu-
tionary advance in the control of epidemics of typhus among civilians.
For the appraisal of the value of a vaccine there is no formula as simple
as the one used in the section on delousing where it could be said that free-
dom from lice meant practical freedom from typhus. Since many variables
and intangible factors were involved, it is more difficult to estimate the
actual efficacy of vaccination against typhus.
By the end of 1941 there was ample evidence from the work of Weigl,
Zinsser, Cox, and others that animals and human beings could be made
resistant to typhus infection by injections of suspensions of killed Rickettsia
prowazeki. This was sufficient to warrant the adoption of typhus vaccina-
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tion by the Army late in 1941. The first preparation used in 1942 was the
Cox yolk sac vaccine. It was known that the original Cox vaccine was not
as good an antigen as desirable. Hence individual and collaborative efforts
were stimulated to produce a better vaccine. Great improvements were
made in 1942 by the ether extraction method discovered by Craigie and by
the addition to the vaccine in 1942 of the soluble specific substance dis-
covered by Topping and Plotz. Results obtained with the earlier vaccine
need not concern us here, although it is recalled that soldiers who received
the original preparations were believed to have acquired some immunity.
Tests with the improved vaccine, carried out by the U.S.A. Typhus Com-
mission among Egyptians at Cairo in 1943 and 1944, showed definitely that
while the vaccine did not protect against infection, it did produce a state
of resistance that greatly ameliorated the disease. The vaccine came to be
regarded chiefly as a mitigator and in a sense as insurance against fatality.
The evidence indicates that the mild, often almost unrecognizable, cases
among vaccinated American troops, and the absence of deaths were attribu-
table to resistance acquired from vaccination.
Although it was shown that lice could be infected by feeding upon a
vaccinated person suffering with typhus, there was no direct evidence that
the spread of the disease was aided by the obscure, often unrecognizable,
cases of typhus occurring among the vaccinated. It appears to be a reason-
able assumption, on the other hand, that vaccination against typhus pre-
vented an undeterminable number of infections. This inference, unprovable
for lack of data, is drawn from the later knowledge that the exposure of
American soldiers to louse-infested typhus victims exceeded all anticipation.
This was true in Egypt, Iran, North Africa, Italy, Japan, and Korea, and
possibly in Germany. In some of these areas there were estimated to be
four or more times as many cases as those reported, indicating incidence in
terms of tens of thousands of cases and consequently high risk of exposure.
The degree of exposure of troops in the North African campaign was not
well known until months after the landings of 1942. The fact that they
had been vaccinated against typhus gave some measure of reassurance. Of
course, how often the vaccine protected against infection, no one will ever
know. An indication of what might have happened if vaccination had not
been employed is given by the experiences of an unvaccinated British unit
at a port at which vaccinated American soldiers were engaged in similar
duties. Among these British troops there were 36 cases of typhus with a
case fatality rate of 32 per cent. During the same period there were 9 mild
cases among all American troops in North Africa and no deaths.
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Reviewing the total experience at this date after the war, the field experi-
ence confirmed the opinion expressed at the National Research Council Con-
ference on Typhus in June, 1944. This opinion is that while vaccination
against epidemic louse-borne typhus does not always prevent infection, it
causes the disease to be mild and appears to prevent death from typhus.
The use to be made of typhus vaccine in the control of an epidemic was a
debatable question at one time. As it takes several weeks for the produc-
tion of a serviceable state of immunity after the injection of the vaccine, it
is obvious that immediate effects upon an outbreak would not be expected.
A vaccination program carried out at the start, however, might be expected
to make the decline of an epidemic more abrupt and certainly might be
expected to save lives. In the author's opinion, the fear of aiding the spread
of the disease by creation of many mild cases of typhus among the vaccinated
is unwarranted, and without any proof from field experience. During the
war it was agreed that vaccination should not be attempted on a mass scale
among a population afflicted or immediately threatened with an epidemic,
but had best be used for the immunization of all "key personnel," officials,
clergy, bankers, transportation workers, and others rendering essential serv-
ices, as well, of course, as all medical and sanitary personnel engaged in the
work of control of the epidemic and care of the sick. Finally, it is not to
be forgotten that one of the greatest values of vaccination against typhus is
the protection of the workers in laboratories and plants where typhus vac-
cine is tested and manufactured.
During the war and the first eight months following the surrender of
Japan, from December 1943 to May 1946, the new preventive and control
measures were applied with the backing of military authority against three
epidemics of typhus fever among war-wracked civilian populations. The
first test was in bombed, chaotic, overcrowded Naples from December 1943
to February 1944.'li The second was in the Inner Reich of Germany, in
areas in which the typhus-ridden inmates from Nazi prison camps had scat-
tered from March to June 1945.' The third was in disorganized Japan,
flooded with repatriates coming in from Korea, in the winter of 1945 and
early spring of 1946.' Conditions varied in each epidemic, but the principles
of control were essentially the same as those laid down at the League of
Nations Typhus Control Conference in 1937, namely, case finding, isolation
of cases and regions (cordon sanitaire), delousing, and immunization. The
methods and materials were the new products of work done during the war.
These were chiefly organization and operation of units of trained person-
nel, mass delousing by dusting with DDT powder fully clothed civilians,
AQ74YALE JOURNAL OF BIOLOGY AND MEDICINE
some use of typhus vaccine, and the maintenance of the reporting systems
that constitute medical intelligence. In each of these epidemics, the peak of
cases was reached at a date earlier than would have been expected to occur
in the absence of control measures, the number of cases was far less than
reasonably might have been anticipated, the decline of the outbreaks was
relatively abrupt, and the secondary foci or small coincident local outbreaks
were promptly extinguished. The epidemiological data on which these state-
ments are based are to be found in the publications cited. The conclusion is
warranted that for the first time in the history of typhus in wartime, epi-
demics of the disease were brought under control and stopped before they
had run their previously customary course.
The control of typhus fever achieved during World War II deserves to
rank among the foremost achievements of military preventive medicine.
The achievement freed military operations from the hampering effect which
typhus in the past had exerted upon campaigns-an effect which had
occasionally determined the outcome of a war. The significance of the
achievement for civilian preventive medicine and public health is even
greater. While the time may be long before typhus is eradicted from its
ancient endemic regions, the statement may now be made with assurance
that given the means and the will to use them no country need ever again
suffer from a devastating epidemic of typhus fever.
There were peculiarities in the behavior of typhus fever between the wars,
and these peculiarities should be noted as background against which to
judge the claim that control of the disease was gained in World War II.
Following the severe epidemics that occurred in Eastern Europe during
World War I, there were epidemics with cases estimated in the millions in
Roumania, Poland, and Russia in the years 1918 to about 1922. During
the decade from 1923 to 1933 there was a steady decrease in the prevalence
of typhus in Europe and Russia. In Italy there had been no case of typhus
reported in the 15 years from 1928 to 1942, and only 54 cases in the six
years prior to 1928. A generation of non-immunes had grown up in that
country. One may suppose that constant anti-typhus campaigns, wholesale
destruction of lice, improvement of the economic conditions of people, and
a cessation of national wars were the causes of this decline of typhus. How-
ever, it must be admitted that the still mysterious factors of epidemic
periodicity and "epidemic constitution" may have been operating to produce
the result. During the next seven years, 1933 to 1940, however, a new wave
oftyphusoccurredinEgypt, NorthAfrica, SouthAfrica, Roumania, Poland,
Yugoslavia, and in parts of the Soviet Union. There were outbreaks also
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in Chile and Portugal. By 1941 Spain, usually free from the disease, was
involved. When the European war broke out in 1939, typhx- was on the
move again, and when the United States entered World War II in 1941,
there was ample reason for the fear that this most tremendous and destruc-
tive of all wars might be accompanied by epidemics of typhus fever as
severe, if not more devastating, than any in the long history of this major
cause of human misery. This fear was increased by uncertainties due to the
breakdown of international epidemiological reporting after 1939, and the
consequent low state of medical intelligence (epidemiological information).
As we lookat the total situation in retrospect we feel justified in saying that
these things might have happened, but did not happen because great scien-
tific advances in the knowledge of typhus and possible means of control had
been made between the wars, and because vigorous co-operative actions
were taken to speed up improvements and to apply effective preventive
measures with the full force of military authority supported by democratic
peoples united in a common purpose.
Many individuals, agencies, and organizations joined wholeheartedly in
the wartime attack against typhus. For many reasons, one of the organiza-
tions of particular interest was the United States of America Typhus
Commission, established by Executive Order No. 9285 by President Frank-
lin Delano Roosevelt on December 24, 1942. The account of the origin of
this Commission from a long series of conferences held by Brigadier General
James S. Simmons, Chief of the Preventive Medicine Service, Office of The
Surgeon General, U. S. Army, starting early in July 1942, when the North
Africa landing was in the planning stages, has been published.2 It is recalled
that the leaders associated with him were Dr. Rolla E. Dyer, Chief of the
National Institute of Health of the United States Public Health Service,
Rear Admiral Charles S. Stephenson, (MC), U. S. Navy, Chief of the
Preventive Medicine Division of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery of
the Navy, and later Brigadier General Leon A. Fox. A host of names de-
serves to be mentioned, but space does not permit the inclusion of the dis-
tinguished roster. These names, however, indicate the main characteristic
of the Commission, which was a union of the Services for a common pur-
pose.
The establishment of commissions to deal with special problems of na-
tional concern has been a time-honored procedure of the Government of
the United States and other governments. In civilian experience, and in
the experience of the Public Health Service, the Navy, and the Army, there
are numerous examples of commissions established to investigate diseases
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and to recommend and apply measures for their control. To cite cases from
the experience of the Medical Department of the Army alone, particular
mention may be made of the Yellow Fever Commission of 1901, the
Pneumonia Board of 1918, and the Army Epidemiological Board of World
War II. The Army Epidemiological Board, established in January 1941,
as the result of plans and recommendations of General Simmons, "for the
investigation and control of influenza and other epidemic diseases in the
Army," had successfully combined expert civilian and military activities,
and had been operating both as a War Department agency and as a division
of Preventive Medicine Service of the Office of The Surgeon General. The
establishment of the United States of America Typhus Commission was,
therefore, in accordance with tradition and current practice. However, the
U.S.A. Typhus Commission had some additional characteristics that were
derived from the unusual potential dangers of typhus and from the economic
and political history of this disease.
Executive Order No. 9285! was broadly conceived. It expressed the
Government's realization of the importance of typhus fever as a threat to the
safety of soldiers, a possible hindrance to military operations, and a prob-
able cause of devastation among the civilian populations with which the
armed forces were in contact and for which they would have dependency
responsibilities under military government in liberated and occupied coun-
tries. In accordance with the estimate of the risks, the Executive Order gave
the Commission commensurate scope, responsibilities, and authorizations,
under the Secretary of War. It invoked and directed the assistance and
support of the Commission by numerous military, executive, and govern-
mental agencies to effectuate a program for the study and control of typhus
fever both within and without the United States when typhus fever threat-
ened or might threaten the military population. While making no change
in the special activities of the Services, the Executive Order brought to-
gether the Army, Navy, and Public Health Service in a joint attack upon
typhus. In language characteristic of a democracy even in war, the Order
directed the Commission to "secure cooperation" and to "collaborate" with
all appropriate organizations.
This is not the place to summarize the staff studies that preceded the
issuance of the Executive Order, or to outline the system of approvals and
channels that had to be developed to handle the affairs of the Commission,
or discuss the many personal and operational problems that were solved in
one way or another. Suffice it to say that these were exhaustive, intricate,
490COMMENTARY ON TYPHUS CONTROL IN WORLD WAR II
and novel to the extent that the Commission was anomalous among military-
medical agencies for which no previous provisions had been made.
The field of interest was interpreted to include epidemic (louse-borne)
typhus, endemic (murine, flea-borne) typhus, and scrub typhus (mite-
borne) tsutsugamushi disease. Through this mandate, the Commission be-
came engaged in the unforseen crises of a global war in all areas in which
rickettsial diseases were a threat to military operations. The Commission,
with headquarters in Washington, worked not only in the United States,
but also in all the chief theaters of operations overseas. Some of the activities
of the Commission will be briefly summarized because of their general in-
terest and implications.
In a small way the Commission was an early example of unification of the
Services. Its personnel, commissioned and non-commissioned, was detailed
from the Army, Navy, and Public Health Service. It was a composite unit
under the War Department. There was no great difficulty in the manage-
ment of the affairs of officers and enlisted men, in accordance with the basic
requirements of their respective Services while they were serving with the
Commission.
Through the terms of Executive Order No. 9285 and the support and
approval accorded by higher authority, the Director of the Commission, a
medical officer, had direct access to the chiefs of government departments,
including the Secretary of War and the Secretary of State. This privilege
of direct communication included also relations between the Director and
the General Staff, the special staff of Civil Affairs, the Army Service Forces
Staff, and the offices of Commanders of Theaters of Operation. Direct
communication on behalf of the Commission was made possible with all
agencies concerned in this country, with several foreign missions, and with
many individuals. The advantages for effective and expeditious operation
were enormous.
Although the Commission had no budget of special appropriations, it was
in a position to request and support requests for large expenditures for
materials needed for typhus control. It assisted in obtaining priorities and
funds for the rapid manufacture of DDT. It was instrumental in placing
"firm requisitions" for millions of doses of typhus vaccine at a time when
there was a risk that manufacture of the vaccine might have to be curtailed,
with consequent dispersal of the specially trained and immunized personnel
working on vaccine production at commercial plants. The Commission was
able to expedite, at critical moments, the transportation by sea and air of
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supplies to combat typhus, and at all times to assist in the preparation and
assemblage of anti-typhus supplies.
During the war the assembling and holding of trained expert personnel
for particular purposes was a constant problem because of the general man-
power needs of the country. Through the Commission it was possible to
maintain a unit of experts on typhus and to preserve civilian laboratory
organizations engaged in work on typhus.
Through privileges of representation of higher authority the Commission
was able to assist in matters of general diplomatic and governmental nature.
It had mutually beneficial relations with Civil Affairs and with military
commissions and governments in foreign countries, with the Lend Lease
Administration, with the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitations Ad-
ministration (UNRRA), and with similar agencies. At the Cairo Confer-
ence in 1943 the Commission, represented by General Fox, was instrumental
in securing free distribution of typhus vaccine to Middle East countries.
Through General Fox, a group of officers of the Commission was admitted
to Yugoslavia in 1944, and an officer of the Commission accompanied the
British Military Mission into Greece.
The Collected Reprints 1943-19471O of the Commission present most of
the original scientific work done on typhus and related rickettsial diseases
by members of the Commission. Additional publications have been made
since 1947. Well-equipped laboratories staffed by experts were established
and maintained by the Commission in Cairo, Egypt, and in Assam-Burma.
In addition to typhus materials returned to laboratories, specimens of rare
plants and animals were sent from these stations to museums in this country.
Furthermore, the Commission had the privilege of assisting in obtaining
facilities and support for laboratory investigations of typhus in the United
States and England.
In the episodes of the control of the typhus epidemics among the civilian
populations in Naples, the Inner Reich, and in Japan, summarized above,
are to be found the best examples of the value of such an organization as the
Commission. Supported by military authority, and with the collaboration
of other agencies, it served effectively in curbing these dangerous outbreaks
of the disease.
While the material for this review has been drawn almost entirely from
the experience of the United States of America Typhus Commission, the
commentary has not been intended to be so centered. The details are to be
regarded as illustrations of some of the general aspects and meaning of the
control of typhus.
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In the past typhus has determined the outcome of military campaigns and
has affected the economy, morals, and social institutions of communities. As
a result of control over the disease gained during World War II these effects
of the disease need not occur again. The spectacular role of effective pre-
ventive medicine in a crisis is apt to be forgotten when the continuation of
safeguards becomes the routine observance of familiar precautions. But the
influence of preventive medicine upon the course of events persists and will
remain a power, however inconspicuous, in keeping typhus within bounds.
The restraint of typhus may be as effectively accomplished by national effort
and international collaboration in peace as it was during the war. The re-
sults afford another example of the world-binding influence of international
epidemiology and control of infectious disease. It is trusted that forces of
peaceful international associations were strengthened by demonstrations of
the control of typhus fever in World War II.
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